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G. L. GARDINER 
The Empirical Study of Reference 
The first section of this essay reconstructs four empirical studies of 
reference, which then serve as a basis for the discussions which fol-
low. Section II shows that the principal notions on which these 
studies are based are deficient. It is observed that their deficiencies 
do not permit reliable results. Section III discusses the conventional 
concept of reference, through which reference is perceived as per-
formed only by reference librarians; it concludes that the empirical 
interpretation of the conventional concept is fruitless as a framework 
for the development of the empirical study of reference. Section IV 
considers reference outside of librarianship. It suggests that reference 
is a special case of problem solving. On the basis of this consideration, 
Section V proposes a new framework for the empirical study of ref-
erence. 
SECTION I 
FOUR EMPIRICAL STUDIES of reference 
are briefly reconstructed in this section. 
Of the studies of reference with which 
the author is familiar, they appear to 
contain the most insight. They are 
presented in chronological order. By 
chance the first two studies were written 
by librarians; the second two, by non-
librarians. The reconstructions serve as 
a basis for the discussions of the follow-
ing sections. 
Cole understood reference to be the 
"queries which people bring to the desk 
of the reference librarian" and the li-
brarian's response to the queries in 
terms of "materials best suited to the 
needs of the reader."1 Her objective was 
"to identify reference questions ... and 
1 Dorothy Ethlyn Cole, "An Analysis of Adult Ref-
erence Work in Libraries" (unpublished master's the-
sis, Graduate Library School, University of Chicago, 
1943 ), p. 1. 
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describe . . . the sources of reference in-
formation"2 in public, academic, and 
speaiallibraries. 
The data of her study were the result 
of a questionnaire. For each reference, 
as interpreted under Cole's definition, 
the questionnaire requested the follow-
ing returns: 
1. What the patron wanted. 2. Exact 
statement of the question. 3. Occupation 
of the patron. 4. Specific books and other 
tools used in finding the answer. 5. Other 
functions performed. 6. Was the question 
answered satisfactorily. If not, indicate rea-
son.3 
Fourteen libraries reacted to the ques-
tionnaire. Four of them were public, 
four were academic, and six were spe-
cial libraries. The data were first manip-
ulated for readings on reference ques-
tions, then for readings on reference 
sources. 
2 Ibid., p. 2. 
a Ibid., p. 24. 
The first set of manipulations includ-
ed these. The returns of No. 2, above, 
were classified by subject. That is, each 
statement of a question was mapped 
into one of the divisions of the Decimal 
Classification. The subject of a question 
was then characterized as a function of 
its origin, i.e., public, academic, or spe-
cial library. The returns of No. 3 were 
classed into such occupational categories 
as housewives, unskilled laborers, and 
skilled laborers. The returns of No. 2 
were classified by time. The temporal 
classification consisted of the following 
historical periods: -499, 500-1899, 1900-
1940, 1941, 1942- . The subject of a 
question was characterized as a function 
of its time. The returns of No. 2 were 
classified by complexity. This classifica-
tion, in outline, included: fact, how-to-
do, supporting evidence, and general in-
formation categories. The returns of No. 
1 were classed by specificity. The re-
turns of No. 1, that is, were compared 
with the respective returns of No. 2. If 
"what the patron wanted" was the same 
as "the exact statement of the question," 
then that question was classed as spe-
cific; otherwise it was classed as non-
specific. Specificity was then character-
ized as a function of both origin and 
occupation. 
The second set of manipulations re-
quired the following operations. The re-
turns of No. 2 were classified by com-
plexity. The returns of No. 4 were clas-
sified by form, i.e., such as reference, 
non-reference, periodical, and docu-
ment. The form of a source was then 
characterized as a function of the com-
plexity of a question. 
Unlike Cole, Breed4 did not indicate 
his concept of reference. Since his study 
was largely a follow-up of Cole's study, 
it was entirely unnecessary that he 
should. Indeed, as the following recon-
4 Paul Francis Breed, "An Analysis of Reference Pro-
cedures in a Large University Library" (unpublished 
master's thesis , Graduate Library School, University of 
Chicago, 1955). 
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struction will show, it is reasonable to 
assume his entertainment of a concept 
of reference more similar to Cole's than 
to any alternative. Breed undertook the 
study of difficult reference questions in 
a large university library. 
To Breed a difficult reference ques-
tion was one for which "the ordinary ref-
erence sources failed to produce an an-
swer."5 Breed purposed "to discover 
something about the persons asking the 
questions . . . the kinds of questions 
asked" and "to compare the extent to 
which certain kinds of knowledge ... 
were called upon by the reference li-
brarian in the search process."6 Breed's 
knowledge typology included knowl-
edge associated with a general liberal 
arts background, subject specialization, 
personal knowledge, knowledge · gained 
in the process of search, and library 
school and library experience. These 
knowledge types wer.e intended to ex-
plain each step of the reference librar-
ian's search. A reference step was de-
fined as the reference librarian's consul-
tation of any source or entry in a source. 
The data of Breed's study was there-
sult of a questionnaire. The question-
naire provided for the following returns 
on each reference: 
1. A precise statement of the· information 
wanted. 2. The name and/ or occupation 
of the person or organization making the 
request, and the manner in which it was 
made (telephone, letter, or in person). 3. 
The time required to answer the question. 
4. A step-by-step account of the method 
employed to deal with the question. 5. 
Whether the question was answered, par-
tially answered, or not answered. 7 
The reference staff of Harper Library, 
University of Chicago, acted upon the 
questionnaire. After difficult questions 
were isolated from other questions, the 
data were manipulated for readings on 
those questions and for readings on the 
5 Ibid ., p. 19. 
s Ibid., p. 1-2. 
1 Ibid. , p. 4. 
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processes by which those questions were 
answered. 
For readings on the difficult questions 
the following manipulations were made. 
The returns of No. 1, above, were 
classed by subject, i.e., social, biological, 
or physical sciences, and the humanities. 
The returns of No. 2 were classified by 
origin, campus or non-campus. The 
questions falling into the former cate-
gory, "were examined for deviations 
from a known subject specialization."8 
The returns of No. 1 were classified as 
being specific or general. Generality 
was indicated if a question "called for 
broad treatment of a subject or . . . in-
volved a process of selection and evalua-
tion of material."9 There were very few 
general questions; they were not given 
further consideration in Breed's study. 
Those questions characterized by spec-
ificity were dichotomously classed as 
bibliographical or factual. Bibliographi-
cal questions were first classed by form, 
i.e., questions about books, periodicals, 
learned society publications, or U.S. 
government documents, then classed by 
inaccuracies of personal or corporate 
authorship, title, and date of publication. 
The inaccuracy of a question was then 
characterized as a function of its form. 
Factual questions were classified into 
numerous categories, often individual 
categories. 
The second set of manipulations were 
undertaken for readings on the librar-
ian's search process. The returns of No. 
4 were categorized by knowledge, as 
indicated above. The subject of a ques-
tion was then characterized as .a func-
tion of the knowledge required to an-
swer it. Final steps used in answering 
questions were isolated. A final step 
was defined as "the step which resulted 
in a solution."10 Such steps were not 
necessarily final · in the sense of last 
steps. The subject of a question was 
8 Ibid ., p. 22. 
~ Ibid., p. 24. 
10 Ibid. , p. 52. 
then characterized as a function of the 
knowledge utilized by the librarian in 
taking final steps. 
To the Hemers, reference consisted 
of (Call the problems within organizations 
or among groups of workers which 
require searches for information."11 
Though they condemned .a study of ref-
erence «which leads or permits the in-
formation seeker ... to place the task 
of getting the information he needs in 
the hands of a person or group outside 
of himself" as "a study of a certain, nar-
row type of information requirement,"1 2 
they produced such a study. And, though 
their concept of reference differed from 
Cole's, the concept of reference which 
guided their study did not. Their ob-
jective was to define "those information 
requirements which reference librarians 
and other information specialists are 
likely to be called upon to meet."13 
The data of the Herners' study also 
resulted from a questionnaire. It re-
quested the name of the organization re-
ceiving the question and the question 
itself. Fourteen atomic energy research 
and reference organizations forwarded 
to the Herners all questions received 
from the fall of 1956 through the fall of 
1957. The data which the Herners re-
ceived were manipulated only for read-
ings on the questions. 
After technical questions, those "in-
volving one or more of the natural or 
engineering sciences,"14 were isolated; 
technical as well as non-technical ques-
tions were separately classified by sub-
ject. Non-technical questions were then 
disregarded. Technical questions, how-
ever, were further classified by number 
of discrete concepts and the logical re-
u Saul Herner and Mary Herner, " Determining Re-
quirements for Atomic Energy Information from Ref-
erence Questions," Preprints of Papers for the Inter-
national Conference on Scientific Information, Wash-
ington, D .C., November 16-21 , 1958 (Washington: Na-
tional Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 
1958 ), p. 172. 
12 Ibid. 
1 3 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. , p. 173. 
lationships among the discrete concepts. 
A discrete concept was defined as a 
significant concept which could not be 
subdivided without changing its essen-
tial meaning. For example, "the question 
'Give me information on engineering in 
nuclear reactors,' was taken to contain 
two concepts, 'engineering' and 'nuclear 
reactors.' "15 Only questions containing 
two or more· discrete concepts were 
classed by logical relationships. The 
logical relationships were defined as log-
ical sums, "where the requestor would 
settle for information about concept A 
or concept B"; logical products "where 
the requestor had to have information 
about concept A and concept B"; and 
logical differences, "where the requestor 
was interested in concept A, but not 
concept B."16 
Carlson described reference as ''hu-
man searching behavior."17 His study 
emerged from the problem of determin-
ing an optimum search procedure of a 
very large file. Reference librarians were 
chosen as subjects for his study for they 
are "the most trained in search proce-
dures."18 Like the Herners, though his 
concept of reference differed from 
Cole's, the concept of reference which 
guided his study did not. The objective 
of Carlson's study was to describe search 
procedures used by reference librarians 
in order: · 
1. To illustrate that human search behav-
ior can be precisely described . . . . 2. To 
improve the present search procedures 
used b.y humans .... 3. To develop new 
training procedures for librarians. 4. To 
make it possible to develop computer rou-
tines that could assist the human in making 
complex searches of a file.19 
Three persons served as subjects. 
1s Ibid., p. 174. 
16 Ibid., p. 175. 
17 G. Carlson, Search Strategy by Reference Librarians 
(Part 3 of the Final Report on the Organization of 
Large Files [Sherman Oaks, California: Advance Sys-
tems, Hughes Dynamics, 1964] ), p. ii. 
18 Ibid., p. 2. 
19 Ibid., p. 1. 
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They were the reference librarians in 
a university medical library. The file 
searched was the library collection with 
which the subjects were familiar. "The 
basic procedure was to present a search 
problem to a reference librarian and 
then record in detail his search tech-
niques.''20 Protocols, · verbatim records, 
and descriptions of all that subjects say 
and do during a study, were obtained 
from the observations of two persons. 
The observers recorded everything they 
could see or hear during the searches. 
Presumably the subjects were requested 
to "think aloud" during the searches. Af-
ter several protocols were gathered, they 
were analyzed for consistent search rou-
tines. The resultant routines were then 
tested against another protocol. The 
process was repeated. The product of 
these operations was a flow chart. The 
initial flow chart was compared with 
and modified by the original and addi-
tiona! protocols. 
SEcriON II 
In this section it is argued that the 
major notions on which the recon-
structed studies of reference are built 
are productive of results which are un-
reliable. For various, often similar rea-
sons, these notions are in need of serious 
explication. In several cases it is noted 
that such explication does not seem 
forthcoming. 
That the notion, the subject of a ques-
tion, warrants discussion is by no means 
obvious . Cole was unable to correlate 
the subject of a question with either its 
origin or its historical period. Indeed, 
the Herners observed that "the results of 
a study such as the present one, based 
on questions from workers in a field 
other than atomic energy, would pro-
duce results quite different from those 
obtained in the present one . . . conduct-
ed at some future time, would also pro-
duce results at a variance with the pres-
ent ones."21 
20 Ibid. , p. 3. 
21 Herner and Herner, op. cit., p. 176. 
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To Cole the significance of the subject 
of a question was its conjectured power 
to predict subject interests of reference 
patrons. Its significance to the Herners 
presumably was quite similar. It is ques-
tionable, however, that either Cole's or 
the Herners' results characterized the 
subject interests of patrons in the simple 
one-to-one correspondence supposed. 
Cole defined the subject of a question 
by those operations which specify the 
class number of a book by means of the 
Decimal Classification. The subject of a 
question, then, was the subject as in-
terpreted under that scheme. The in-
terpretation of questions under that 
scheme, however has several obvious 
disadvantages. 
Under interpretation of the Decimal 
Classification, for example, it is obvious 
that two or more questions about the 
same subject are not necessarily mapped 
into the same class. Though the pair of 
questions "Who chopped down the 
cherry tree?" and eeWho was the first 
president of the U.S.?" both have the 
same subject, the latter is decimally 
classifiable under history but the former 
is classifiable under the social sciences. 
Or, given the pair of questions "What 
are the properties of an irregular cube?" 
and e'What are the basic tenets of Law-
sonomy?" the latter is unclassifiable un-
til or unless it is known what indeed 
Lawsonomy is and the former, though 
it has no subject, is classifiable in the 
pure sciences. 
To circumscribe the artificiality of 
the Decimal and similar classification 
schemes, consider criteria for a more 
natural scheme: 22 (1) the subject of a 
question is independent of its various 
formulations and ( 2) it is about the ex-
tension of its subject term ( s). Though 
these criteria dispel some of the diffi-
culties just observed in connection with 
22 For this example credit is due Hilary Putnam, 
"Formalization of the Concept 'About,'" Philosophy of 
Science, XXV (April 1958), 125; cf. Nelson Good-
man, "About," Mind, LXX (January 1961). 
the Decimal scheme, they create diffi-
culties of their own. By condition 1, 
question (a) "Is Henry Miller the au-
thor of Little Women?" is by subject 
equivalent to question (b) eels the au-
thor of Little Women, Henry Miller?" 
By condition 2, however, question (a) 
is about Henry Miller and question (b) 
is about Louisa May Alcott; therefore, 
questions (a) and (b) do not have the 
same subject and criteria 1 .and 2 are 
contradictory. 
Indeed, besides the absence of a 
simple one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the subject of a question and its 
interpretation under a classification 
scheme, as well as the lack of a formal-
ization of our concept eeabout," there is 
experimental evidence that subject clas-
sification is far from the objective proc-
ess assumed by either Cole or the Hern-
ers.23 Appropriately recast, the subject 
of a question undoubtedly has some-
thing important to tell us of reference 
behavior. Under its present formula-
tions, however, it has almost nothing to 
tell us. 
Breed's notion of the difficulty of a 
question is similar to Cole's notion of 
the specificity of a question in several 
respects. Rather than descriptive of the 
patron, as she supposed, Cole's notion 
of the specificity of a question was 
equally descriptive of the librarian. Cole 
defined specificity as the absence of a 
difference between the patron's ques-
tion and the librarian's interpretation of 
that question. To exemplify non-spec-
ificity Cole wrote of the student who 
asked for the other author of The Tam-
ing of the Shrew and the librarian who 
gave Henry James as the answer. If the 
librarian of Cole's example arrived at 
his answer by comparing the formula-
tion of the question and the formulation 
of the solution at hand, then it is ob-
23 See Mary Cuddy St. Laurent, "A Review of the 
Literature of Indexer Consistency" (unpublished mas-
ter's thesis, Graduate Library School, University of 
Chicago, 1966). 
vious that a librarian who held "the 
Taming of a Shrew," or possibly Turn 
of the Screw as well, in his cognitive 
structure, undoubtedly would have an-
swered the student of Cole's example in 
quite another way. Indeed, rather than 
exemplifying non-specificity, the ques-
tion "Who besides Shakespeare wrote 
The Taming of the Shrew?"24 would 
have exemplified specificity. 
Breed observed that, when they were 
received, difficult reference questions 
"appeared on the surface to be unex-
ceptional questions which the usual ref-
erence books would answer."25 For that 
reason he defined difficult questions as 
those for which "the ordinary reference 
sources failed to ·produce an answer."26 
Like Cole's notion of specificity, Breed's 
notion of difficulty is indeterminately 
characteristic of either the patron or the 
librarian or, indeed, the environment in 
which the question is asked. Under 
Breed's definition the difficulty of a 
question is an empty notion. Under 
Breed's definition, that is, a question is 
difficult only if a question is difficult. 
Breed's manipulations on the set of 
difficult questions were productive, then, 
of .a miscellany of tenuously related re-
sults. 
Let us probe this matter somewhat 
further. Given Reitman's description of 
a problem as having an initial state and 
a terminal state, a problem solution may 
be described as being a set of operations 
by which the former is convertible into 
the latter.27 On the basis of this de-
scription it is possible, for example, to 
express the question "How is a sow's ear 
changed into a silk purse?" by the fol-
lowing rule: 
Description-contains sublist 1. 
sublist 1-sublist 2, sublist 3, sublist 4. 
24 Cole, op. cit., p. 40. 
25 Breed, op. cit., p. 19. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Walter R. Reitman, Cognition and Thought, An 
Information-Processing Approach (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 133. 
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sublist 2-is, initial state; contains sublist 
5. 
sublist 3-is terminal state; contains sub-
list 6. 
sublist 4-process; input, sublist 5; out-
put sublist 6. 
sublist 5-is, sow's ear. 
sublist 6-is, silk purse.28 
If a person has an element in his 
cognitive structure which satisfies this 
rule, then that person has a solution to 
this question. If, however, that person 
does not have an element in his cogni-
tive structure which satisfies this rule, 
then he cannot achieve a solution to the 
question unless he is successful in set-
ting up substitutive or subordinate ques-
tions to the one at hand. For example, 
it is possible to achieve a solution to the 
question given above by replacing the 
implicit physical constraint by a value 
constraint such that the value of the sale 
of a sow's ear will equal the value, or 
partial value, of the purchase of a silk 
purse. In any case, short of knowing pre-
cisely what elements are held by a given 
cognitive structure and its environment 
and, indeed, of knowing what counts as 
a satisfactory solution to a given ques-
tion, the task of explicating the notion 
"the difficulty of a question" will prove 
a formidable task. 
At various points in his study Breed 
observed deficiencies in his knowledge 
typology. For example, he observed that 
liberal arts and personal knowledge 
"were too subtle to be grasped in a study 
of this kind,"29 that knowledge gained 
in the process of search and library spe-
cialized knowledge were not readily 
distinguishable "where final successful 
steps were concerned,"30 and that "the 
separation of kinds of knowledge is 
slightly unrealistic; the reference librar-
ian combines knowledge of many differ-
28 Ibid., p. 134. 
2o Breed, op. cit., p. 52. 
ao Ibid. , p. 56-57. 
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ent kinds in his exercise of judgement 
and his interpretation of the data at 
hand."31 Although almost nothing is 
known about one's personal knowledge, 
what is reasonably conjectured when re-
lated to Breed's self-criticism, makes 
that criticism seem largely understated. 
Newell, Shaw, and Simon, for example, 
have conjectured that cognitive domains 
are structured by 
1. A control system consisting of a num-
ber of memories, which contain symbol-
ized information and are interconnected 
by various ordering relations. . . . 2. A 
number of primitive information processes, 
which operate on the information in the 
memories .... 3. A perfectly definite set of 
rules for combining these processes .... 32 
If this conjecture is correct or even 
nearly correct, then one's knowledge 
consists not only of hierarchies of in-
formation but also hierarchies of rules 
for manipulating and modifying the in-
formation as well as the rules them-
selves. In that case, each sort of one's 
knowledge would be so intimately 
bound up with every other sort that to 
speak of identifying the sort of knowl-
edge which led to a specific action 
would be misleading; to suppose the 
reality of such identification would be 
ridiculous. 
Breed defined a reference step ·as the 
librarian's consultation of any source or 
entry in a source. Use of the reference 
step as the basic unit in the process of 
answering reference questions, however, 
has the same obvious disadvantages as 
the use of the human pulse beat to meas-
ure time. Like the human pulse beat, 
the reference step would differ for dif-
ferent people and would differ for the 
same person at different times, at dif-
ferent places, and under different con-
ditions of mental and physical health. 
31 Ibid., p. 58. 
32 Allen Newell, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert A. Simon, 
"Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving," 
Psychological Review, LXV (May 1958), 151. 
Gagne has suggested several variables 
of individual difference which point up 
the problems inherent in such notions 
as the specificity or difficulty of a ques-
tion, the knowledge used in answering 
questions and the reference step as de-
fined by Breed.33 One person, for ex-
ample, may possess more information 
and more rules for applying that infor-
mation than another; be more facile in 
the recall of stored information; more 
able to select and maintain conceptual 
distinctions in the face of conflicting 
cues; more fluent than another in formu-
lating hypotheses; more steady in the 
retention of a solution model; more 
rapid in verifying a solution. Implicit in 
Gagne's comments in relation to such 
notions is that variables of individual 
difference must be given experimental 
control or that such notions must be 
given independent study and explica-
tion. Simon .and Kotovsky, for example, 
have proposed a theory which "predicts 
rather successfully which problems, from 
a set of letter series completion test 
items, will be the more difficult for 
human S's."34 In Section VI Hayes's ex-
perimental control over variables of in-
dividual difference is observed in a 
study of problems characterized by se-
quences of well-defined steps. 
Though the Herners interpreted their 
results on the conceptual structure of 
reference questions into information re-
trieval, intuitively at least, these results 
would seem to have implications for ref-
erence. It is intuitively reasonable to 
suspect that in a spoken question-an-
swering system, the number of signifi-
cant concepts per question will not ex-
ceed the span of immediate memory, 
i.e., the number of symbols which a per-
son can repeat, orally or manually, in 
33 Robert M. Gagne, "Human Problem Solving: In-
ternal and External Events," Benjamin Kleinmuntz 
( ed. ), Problem Solving: Research, Method, and Theory 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 143-46. 
34 Herbert A. Simon and Kenneth Kotovsky, "Human 
Acquisition of Concepts for Sequential Patterns," Psy-
chological Review, LXX (November 1963), 534. 
correct sequence and without error after 
a single presentation. For example, as 
Miller has observed, "a person who can 
repeat nine binary digits will have a 
span of about eight decimal digits, sev-
en letters of the alphabet, or five mono-
syllabic English words."35 Also, it seems 
reasonable to expect a human encod-
ing device to produce logical products 
more frequently than logical sums and 
to produce logical sums more frequent-
ly than logical differences. Several 
studies have suggested that humans 
categorize conjunctively more readily 
than disjunctively and prefer, in cate-
gonzmg, positive over negative in-
stances.36 Quite why and under what 
conditions these results obtain is barely 
speculated upon as, in Bruner's words, 
"one eventually begins to wonder wheth-
er Nature herself does not abhor dis-
junctive concepts."37 The Herners' re-
sults on the conceptual structure of ref-
erence questions reinforce these suspi-
cions. 
Recall that a discrete concept was de-
fined by the Herners as a concept which 
is both significant to the information de-
sired and indivisible with respect to its 
essential meaning. Essential meanings, 
however, presuppose criteria, determi-
nancy, and uniformity of usage, which 
common language does not meet. 38 At 
the present time it can, at best, be said 
that a person "has a concept if he has a 
disposition on the basis of which he can 
make nominal classificatory statements 
or responses ('this is X that is not X'); 
it is assumed that the disposition is 
35 George A. Miller, "Human Memory and the Stor-
age of Information," IRE Transactions on Information 
Theory, IT-2, 1956 Symposium on Information Theory, 
Held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, September 10-12, 1956 (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1956), p. 131. 
36 Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow and 
George A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1956). 
37 Ibid., p. 162. 
38 Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Forma-
tion in Empirical Science, Vol. II, No. 7 of the Inter-
national Encyclopedia of Unified Science, ed. Otto 
Neurath, Rudolph Carnap and Charles Morris ( Chica-
go: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 9-10. 
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learned from a number of instances 
which vary among themselves; it is as-
sumed that the responses also be made 
to instances other than those contained 
in the set on which the concept was 
learned; it is taken that the classificatory 
response should not be the only possible 
one."39 Indeed, the essential meaning of 
little from the essential subject of a 
question in Cole's study. In Cole's study 
it was the Decimal Classification which 
seemed to provide intersubjectively syn-
onymous interpretations of subjects. In 
the Herners' study it undoubtedly was 
"a special classification scheme for li-
brarians in the atomic energy field,"40 
a question in the Herners' study differs 
rather than the questions alone, which 
provided the results shown in Table 1 on 
the number of discrete concepts per 
question. 
Logical products were defined by the 
Herners as information about A and B; 
logical sums, as information about A or 
B; and logical differences, as informa-
tion about A and not B. Under this in-
terpretation of the conceptual structure 
of reference questions the Herners re-
ported the results shown in Table 2. 
What is of interest to reference about 
these results is that they need not have 
turned out as they did. Assuming the 
psychological reality of discrete con-
cepts, for the sake of argument, it is pos-
sible to interpret the logical relation-
ships among the discrete concepts of 
th,e question, "Who besides Shakespeare 
wrote The Taming of the Shrew?'' in 
any one of the following ways: (author 
and The Taming of the Shrew), 
( Henry James and The Taming of the 
Shrew) or (Henry James and Turn of 
the Screw), (The Taming of the Shrew 
and not Shakespeare) and so forth. In-
deed, it is entirely clear that such re-
39 John P. Van De Geer and Joseph M. F. Jaspers, 
" Cognitive Functions," Annual Review of Psychology, 
XVII (Palo Alto, California: Annual Reviews, 1966 ), 
149. 
40 Herner and Herner, op. cit., p. 171. 
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TABLE 1 
NuMBER OF DISCRETE CoNCEPTS PER QuESTION41 
Number of concepts 
Number of questions 
Per cent of questions 
1 
466 
12.1 
2 
1818 
47.2 
3 
1167 
30.3 
4 
327 
8.5 
5 
73 
1.9 
6 
0 
0 
TABLE 2 
LoGICAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DISCRETE CoNCEPTS41 
Logical Logical Logical 
products sums differences Totals 
Number of questions (with more than one concept) 
Per cent of questions (with more than one concept) 
3773 45 
98.0 1.2 
33 
0.8 
3851 
100 
suits as those given in Table 2 are 
largely dependent on the experimenter. 
For a more general example, from an 
arbitrary array of four attributes of two 
values each, as Bruner has observed, 
«one can define the same subset of in-
stances with different types of concepts 
... the way in which a person will 
categorize new instances encountered 
will depend drastically upon the type of 
concept he has constructed . . . when 
one learns to categorize a subset of 
events in a certain way, one is doing 
more than learning to recognize new 
instances. . . . One is also learning a 
rule that may be applied to new in-
stances."42 
The major notions around which the 
results of Carlson's study were devel-
oped are what he called regular human 
behavior and inconsistent human behav-
ior. Since what he intended by either 
.regular or inconsistent human behavior 
is not at all clear, the following para-
graphs attempt to clarify the meanings 
of these notions and to point up their 
shortcomings. 
One of Carlson's "most encouraging 
findings" was that "human search be-
havior is really quite regular ."43 By this 
.,_Ibid., p. 175. 
42 Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, op. cit., p. 44-45. 
43 Carlson, OJJ· cit.~ p. 28. 
he meant, as he explained two sentences 
below, that "there is a great deal of 
common behavior"44 in human search 
behavior. If regular behavior is that be-
havior which is common among search-
ers, then it is not unreasonable to ex-
pect inconsistent behavior to be that be-
havior which is not common among 
searchers. As Carlson was at pains to 
point out by numerous examples, how-
ever, inconsistent behavior was consist-
ently practiced by the subjects of his 
study. In other words, it was also found 
to be quite common. Indeed, he ex-
plained that inconsistent behavior is that 
behavior which is detrimental to a suc-
cessful search, e.g., ''human searchers 
are often influenced by the physical en-
vironment . . . he scans mostly those 
documents at a convenient eye level 
. . . he has a strong tendency to select 
clean, brightly colored books."45 If, then, 
inconsistent behavior is that behavior 
which is both common and detrimental 
to a successful search, it does not seem 
unreasonable to surmise that regular be-
havior, in contrast, is that behavior 
which is both common and characteris-
tic of successful searches. If these are 
the meanings which Carlson intended 
for these notions, then we shall see in 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 131-32. 
considering his flow charts of regular 
behavior and his discussion of inconsist-
ent behavior that he stipulated unfor-
tunate meanings for both of these terms. 
If Carlson has indeed How-charted hu-
man search behavior, then his flow charts 
must tend to meet at least one criterion. 
They must tend to specify a set of op-
erations which is sufficient to achieve an 
answer to a question much as a refer-
ence librarian would. However, since a 
description of human search behavior 
must account for both that behavior 
which is successful and that behavior 
which is not successful in a search, Carl-
son's elimination of unsuccessful search 
behavior from regular behavior, indeed 
from the entire study, precludes that 
possibility. One is led to suspect, in fact, 
that instead of preparing a flow chart of 
human search behavior Carlson pre-
pared a flow chart of information re-
trieval. 
Considering Carlson's Generalized 
Flow Chart, reproduced on the follow-
ing page, first from back to front, it is 
evident, on inspecting the second level 
of detail, that his "Exit" intends the 
printout of a bibliography. Unless Carl-
son intends something more general than 
what is ordinarily intended by ~'bibli­
ography," then one must conclude that 
either Carlson equated the conclusion of 
all successful searches with listings as 
outputs or that Carlson has, indeed, not 
How-charted human search behavior at 
all. That is, certainly, successful searches 
conclude with answers other than bibli-
ographical listings, as answers which are 
simply affirmatives or negatives. 
Considering this Generalized Flow 
Chart from front to back, again on the 
second level of detail, his "Select 2-4 
keywords" intends: If terms of input not 
previously encountered, generate syn-
onyms from a general dictionary; other-
wise, generate synonyms from memory; 
then, if synonyms are not available from 
either a general dictionary or from mem-
ory, generate synonyms from a medical 
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dictionary. "Enter synonyms into syn-
onym list; enter adjectives into search 
list, and rank."46 Delete common nouns. 
Finally, place the remaining nouns on 
the search list and rank them. Surely, 
however, "Select 2-4 keywords," as just 
one detailed example from the General-
ized Flow Chart, is not representative of 
successful or unsuccessful human search 
behavior, not even in Carlson's own 
terms since he observed that the ref-
erence librarians of his study never 
checked "the accuracy of their spellings, 
pronunciation, and meaning before the 
search starts."47 Indeed, if in an act of 
communication, the decoding process of 
the listener is an approximate inverse 
of the encoding process of the speaker, 
then Carlson's "Select 2-4 keywords" 
taken inversely will surely not elicit a 
question from any speaker. The suspi-
cion that Carlson's Generalized Flow 
Chart is a model of information retrieval 
rather than of human search behavior, 
as advertised, is more than warranted. 
One of Carlson's "most significant 
findings" of the inconsistent sort was 
that "there is no feedback of the results 
of their search to the librarian."48 On 
the basis of this finding Carlson inferred 
that "the reference librarian has no con-
sistent way of improving the quality of 
his search."49 He concluded that ~'any 
searches completed for a requestor 
should only be given out on the strict 
condition that the librarian be told 
about the usefulness or inadequacies of 
the result."50 
The inference that there is no feed-
back to the reference librarian was 
based on evidence illustrated by the 
following example: During the record-
ing of protocols one of the librarians 
~ Ibid., p. 8. 
41 Ibid., p. 29. 
48 Ibid., p. 35. 
49 Ibid., p. 35-36. 
50 Ibid., p. 36. 
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1) 
2) 
3) 
Select 2-4 key words 
Determine requestor 
language restrictions 
D etermine citation age 
restrictions 
Derive general approach 
4) 
Determine next source 
5) 
Scan for match with search 
tenns and develop synonyms .,._.-~----.... 
from present source 
6) 
7) 
Use criteria to accept or 
reject each entry · 
Any more entries for this 
term match? 
8) 
9) 
10) 
Are criteria met to 
terminate search of 
this sou~ce? 
Are criteria met to 
terminate search? 
Exit 
11) 
FIG. !.-Generalized Flow Chart of Reference Librarians Search Behavior. G. Carlson, Search 
Strategy by Reference Librarians, Part 3 of the Final Report on the Organization of Large Files 
(Sherman Oaks, Calif.: Advance Information Systems, Hughes Dynamics, 1964 ), p. 7. 
stated, "I've never had a reader along on 
this kind of search."51 On the basis of 
this protocol, it seems reasonable to con-
jecture that on other kinds of searches 
the librarian was sometimes accompa-
nied by the reader. According to Carl-
son's construal of feedback, then, feed-
back must have occurred in such cases 
as these. It seems more reasonable to 
assume, however, that patron feedback 
can occur only after the patron has had 
time to evaluate the work done for him 
in relation to the work for which he re-
quested the librarian's help. In that case, 
having the reader along would for the 
most part be irrelevant. But what does 
Carlson intend by feedback? Surely in a 
complex question-answer system as the 
one under discussion, feedback is not 
the simple or obvious activity which 
Carlson describes as "He receives a re-
quest from a person; makes the search, 
often without the requestor present; 
gives the requestor the results; and 
hears no more."52 In the simplest man-
ner feedback should have to be de-
scribed as the librarian's response to the 
patron's output in such a way as to re-
duce the difference between it and a 
prescribed input and the patron's re-
sponse to the librarian's output in such 
a way as to reduce the difference be-
tween it and a prescribed input; as well 
as the librarian's response to his own 
output in such a way as to reduce the 
difference between it and a prescribed 
output and the patron's response to his 
own output in such a way as to reduce 
the difference between it and a pre-
scribed output. "The picture roughly re-
sembles two rings (but rings each of 
which is composed of a series of on-
going and intervening events ) that are 
placed in planes at an angle to each 
other and touching each other at com-
51Jbid., p. 35. 
52 Ibid. 
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mon points in their circumferences."53 
To describe feedback in this, the sim-
plest of ways, makes it absurd to assert 
the absence of feedback on the basis of 
data derived from protocol analysis of 
the librarian alone. Indeed, to refuse the 
reader the desired information until he 
feeds back to the librarian in an obvious 
manner surely makes this the most ab-
surd of Carlson's findings, especially 
since Carlson's construal of inconsistent 
behavior implies that it, like regular be-
havior, results in a successful search. 
SECTION III 
This section of the essay discusses the 
conventional concept of reference and 
its relationship to the empirical study of 
reference. 
Derived from the preparation for and 
the practice of reference, the conven-
tional concept is made explicit in nu-
merous definitions in the literature of li-
brarianship. In these definitions it is 
clearly asserted that only reference li-
brarians perform reference. As focal 
points for our discussion, let us consider 
several definitions of reference; as our 
point of departure, Pierce Butler's coun-
ter to the conventional concept. 
To Pierce Butler such definitions of 
reference as "the assistance given by the 
librarian to readers in acquainting them 
with the intricacies of the catalogue, in 
answering questions, and, in short of do-
ing anything and everything ... to fa-
cilitate access to the resources of the li-
brary,"54 were invalid. To Butler such 
definitions were invalid in that they 
tended to define reference in the trivial 
circle as "what goes on in the reference 
room" and the reference room as "the 
53 Floyd H . Allport, Theories of Perception and the 
Concept of Structure, A Review and Critical Analysis 
with an Introduction to a Dynamic-Structural Theory 
of Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1955), 
p. 526-27. 
~>' William B. Child, "Reference Work at the Colum-
bia College Library," Library Journal, XVI ( October 
1891) , 298. 
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place where reference work is carried 
on."55 Pierce Butler proposed that refer-
ence is "that process by which civilized 
man is able to obtain specific informa-
tion at will by use of books which have 
been organized into a library."56 Unlike 
other definitions of reference, Butler 
suggested that reference is not per-
formed solely by librarians and is not 
performed solely in reference rooms. 
Butler's counter to the traditional con-
cept of reference, however, has made 
little impression. 
In her empirical study of reference, 
Dorothy E. Cole observed no difference 
between Butler's concept of reference 
and her own, as we have noted, the 
"queries which people bring to the desk 
of the reference librarian" and the ref-
erence librarian's response to the queries 
in terms of "materials best suited to the 
needs of the re.ader."57 Indeed, Cole felt 
Butler's to be supportive of her concept 
of reference. In another empirical study 
of reference a difference was observed. 
With unshaken confidence in the tradi-
tional concept, however, Lois Fern58 re-
jected Butler's co~nter. Fern, that is, 
first observed that Butler's concept was 
inconvenient, i.e., she would have had 
to consider "those hundreds of instances 
in which the patron engaged in 'refer-
ence work' without the librarian's as-
sistance"; she then observed that Butler's 
concept was absurd, i.e., she would have 
had to entitle her study "Use of Library 
Catalogs by Reference Librarians En-
gaging in Reference W ork."59 
As students of reference, librarians 
either have not perceived Fern's "hun-
55 Pierce Butler, "Survey of the Reference Field," 
Pierce Butler, ed., The Reference Function of the Li-
brary, Papers Presented before 1 th~ Library Institute at 
the University of Chicago, June 29 to July 10, 1942 
( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 4. 
56 Ibid., p. 11. 
57 Cole, op. cit., p. 1. 
58 Lois Fern, "Library Catalogs as Reference Sources" 
(unpublished master's thesis, Graduate Library School, 
University of Chicago, 1962). 
59 Ibid., p. 8. 
dreds of instances" or perceived them, 
like Fern, as something different from 
reference, perhaps something less than 
reference. They have perceived refer-
ence through the conve·ntional concept. 
They have perceived only what experi-
ence in the preparation for and practice 
of reference has led them to expect. 
There is evidence that "when such ex-
pectations are violated by the environ-
ment, the perceiver's behavior can be 
described as resistance to the recog-
nition of the unexpected or incongru-
ous."60 In the familiar Bruner and Post-
man experiment "On the Perception of 
Incongruity," subjects were shown by 
tachtistoscope a series of five playing 
cards at controlled and gradually in-
creasing levels of exposure. Some of the 
playing cards were normal, i.e., expect-
ed, as the five of hearts; others were 
incongruous, i.e., unexpected, as the red 
six of clubs. «At each exposure the sub-
ject was asked to report everything he 
saw or thought he saw."61 A stimulus 
series was completed by three succes-
sive correct responses to each of the five 
cards at various exposure levels from 
ten up to one thousand milliseconds. 
A few of the subjects perceived the 
normal cards erroneously. One subject, 
for example, mistook the black five of 
spades for the red five of hearts. The 
vast majority of subjects, however, per-
ceived the incongruous cards erroneous-
ly. Subjects identified the red six of 
spades, in a number of cases, as the six 
of spades or as the six of hearts. The 
subjects reported such perceptions with 
considerable assurance. Without uncer-
tainty, that is, they fitted what they 
presumably saw into a normal form or 
color pattern that they expected to see. 
Often subjects compromised on what 
60 Jerome S. Bruner and Leo Postman, "On the Per-
ception of Incongruity: A Paradigm," Journal of Per-
sonality, XVIII (December 1949), 222. 
et Ibid., 210. 
they saw. With the red spade and club 
cards, for example, subjects reported 
seeing such colors as black with red 
lights, lighter than black but blacker 
than red, olive drab, and so on. A few of 
the subjects came suddenly to recognize 
the incongruity of the trick cards. Other 
subjects found something wrong with 
them and came to recognize the incon-
gruity gradually. "A subject viewing a 
red spade may start by reporting a red 
tint which gradually becomes redder on 
succeeding trials until he finally asserts 
that the card is .a red spade."62 Indeed, 
there were several subjects who never 
managed to unmask the incongruity of 
certain of the playing cards. 
Analogically, the Bruner-Postman ex-
periment provides a suggestive schema 
for viewing the librarian's perception of 
reference; fitting, that is, the incongruity 
of reality to one of the neat conceptual 
categories prepared by prior training 
and experience, training and experience 
which do not and never need to indi-
cate that anyone other than librarians 
perform reference. Let us consider now 
some of the implications of the librar-
ian's perception of reference. 
If the student of reference perceives 
reference as performed only by refer-
ence librarians, then in his research he 
is constrained into conceptually setting 
reference librarians apart from other 
human beings. In setting reference li-
brarians apart from other persons, it has 
seemed manifest to the student of ref-
erence that what differentiates the ref-
erence librarian from other persons is 
his preparation for and practice of ref-
erence librarianship. Under the conven-
tional concept of reference, then, the 
empirical study of reference poses two 
pertinent questions to the student of 
reference: How efficient is education for 
reference librarianship? How successful 
is the practice of reference librarian-
62 Ibid. , 222. 
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ship? In the former case the empirical 
study of reference has become an in-
strument for investigating some aspect 
of that preparation and, in the process, 
for suggesting some modification of it; 
in the latter case, an instrument for in-
vestigating and modifying some aspect 
of that practice. Indeed, the results of 
the reference studies reconstructed 
above were interpreted in just that man-
ner. Cole, for example, observed that 
classifying reference questions should 
aid the library administrator in evaluat-
ing "the amount and kind of work done 
by the reference department" and aid 
the library training agencies in deter-
mining the nature and scope of the ref-
erence courses."63 Breed wrote, "The 
findings concerning the reference proc-
ess related to difficult questions have 
implications for library schools and the 
material presented in courses on refer-
ence work. More attention might well 
be paid to the analysis of the reference 
process itself-and problems on the ad-
vanced level -might include more exam-
ples of the kind of incomplete and in-
accurate data with which the reference 
librarian must so frequently work."64 
The Herners said, "It is evident that 
useful data on the information require-
ments of a body of users can be obtained 
from collecting and analyzing statisti-
cal quantities of their reference ques-
tions."65 By useful the Herners presum-
ably meant helpful in specifying "those 
information requirements which librar-
ians ... are likely to be called upon to 
meet."u6 Carlson declared that "In many 
cases, human behavior is inconsistent to 
the detriment of successful search. . . . 
These [inconsistencies] could be used as 
guidelines by librarians to improve their 
search procedures. Perhaps some of 
these inconsistencies or omissions could 
63 Cole, op. cit., p. 58. 
64 Breed, op. cit., p. 65. 
65 Herner and Herner, op. cit., p. 176. 
oo Ibid. , p. 172. 
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be generalized and provide guidelines 
for the training program of reference 
librarians."67 
This viewpoint, of course, does not at 
all invalidate the results of the empiri-
cal studies of reference. It does, how-
ever, make the process by which they 
are derived circular. It does, therefore, 
profoundly affect the manner in which 
they are perceived. Given that the prep-
aration or practice of reference is both 
point of departure and point of con-
clusion of the empirical studies of ref-
erence, the results of these studies must 
often seem, then, to be little more than 
reflective formulations of the very ob-
servations which reference librarians en-
counter in their education or the very 
observations which reference librarians 
make in their work Consider now sev-
eral of the results derived from these 
empirical studies of reference. Cole, 
again as an initial example: Reference 
patrons most frequently ask questions 
in the social sciences, useful arts, and 
history. Breed: Difficult questions are 
characteristically specific rather than 
general and involve bibliographical ref-
erences rather than facts. Bibliographi-
cal questions are difficult to answer be-
cause of omissions or inaccuracies in the 
patron's citation of author, titles, and 
dates of publication. The Herners: Pa-
trons generally ask non-technical ques-
tions .about descriptions of processes or 
methods of procedure. Carlson: "Human 
searchers should be very careful to 
write down their search terms and check 
the accuracy of their spellings, pronun-
ciation, and meaning before the search 
starts, and whenever they adopt a new 
search term as the search progresses .... 
A human searcher would be more con-
sistent if he would follow more rigid 
rules in checking every document or 
source. . . . The reference librarian has 
no consistent way of improving the 
quality of his own search. Any searches 
67 Carlson, op. cit., p. 28. 
completed for a requester should only 
be given out on the strict condition that 
the librarian be told about the useful-
ness or inadequacies of the results."68 
If the results of the empirical studies 
of reference seem to be little more than 
reflective formulations of everyday ob-
servations, observations for which there 
.are hundreds of counter-examples ready 
at hand, then it is hardly surprising that 
Ennis, for example, has characterized 
the endeavor which has produced such 
results as "among the weakest in all li-
brary research."69 
To the non-librarian, the librarian's ' 
commitment to the conventional con-
cept of reference in his empirical re-
search perhaps seems strange. To the 
librarian, for the non-librarian to con-
demn and then use that concept to 
guide his empirical study of reference 
must likewise seem strange. Consider, 
then, two cases: the one illustrated by 
what psychologists have called function-
al fixedness, the other illustrated by 
what they have called distortion pro-
duced by popular opinion. 
First consider the case for librarians, 
as Cole and Breed. "The student attends 
an educational institution on the pre-
sumption that the training he receives 
there will enable him to solve problems 
in later life more adequately and effi-
ciently than would be the case had he 
not received this training .... It is also 
possible, however, that the training 
which the student receives may often, 
alas perhaps more often than we .are 
aware of, make the student less able to 
solve certain new problems."70 The clas-
sical description of functional fixedness 
is Maier's pendulum problem.71 
68 Ibid., p. 29-36. 
69 Philip H. Ennis, "The Study of the Use and Users 
of Recorded Knowledge," Library Quarterly, XXXIV 
( October 1964) , 309. 
70 Rudolph W. Schulz, "Problem Solving Behavior 
and Transfer," Harvard Educational Review, XXX 
( Winter 1961), 61. 
71 Norman R. F. Maier, "Reasoning in Humans: II, 
the Solution of a Problem and Its Appearance in Con-
sciousness," Journal of Comparative Psychology, XI 
(August 1931), 181-94. 
Subjects were introduced into a room 
where two pieces of cord were suspend-
ed from the ceiling. The room con-
tained, besides the suspended cords, 
"many objects such as poles, ringstands, 
clamps, pliers, extension cords, tables 
and chairs."72 The subjects were told 
to tie the two pieces of cord together. 
The cords, however, were too far apart 
for a single individual to hold both ends 
simultaneously. Though several solutions 
to the problem were possible, one 
seemed especially difficult for the sub-
jects to grasp. It was the solution 
achieved by weighting one of the cords 
with pliers, setting the cord in motion 
and catching it after the other cord had 
been seized. Most of the subjects did 
not perceive the cord as a potential pen-
dulum and the pliers as a potential 
weight. In general terms the subjects 
of Maier's study demonstrated an in-
ability to displace old, learned concepts 
with new ones required by a novel task. 
Similarly, the subjects who are our con-
cern in this essay have demonstrated an 
inability to displace that concept of ref-
erence learned in the preparation for 
its practice and in the practice itself by 
concepts required for the task, generally 
novel to librarians, of the study of refer-
ence. 
Consider now the case for non-librar-
ians as the Herners and Carlson. Recall 
that the Herners condemned and that 
Carlson called the conventional concept 
of reference into question. Recall that 
unlike Cole and Breed, who were com-
mitted to that concept by prior training 
and experience, the Herners and Carl-
son were not. Recall that though their 
concepts of reference differed from that 
of Cole and Breed, the concept of refer-
ence which guided their studies did not. 
The evidence here suggests that "the in-
terfering influence of the familiar ex-
tends even to situations where the sub-
ject is presumably confined to rigid rules 
72 lbid ., 18 2. 
Empirical Study of Reference I 145 
of thought that should exclude it."73 
In a series of tests on "The Distortion 
of Syllogistic Reasoning Produced by 
Personal Convictions," Morgan and 
Morton showed that subjects tend to 
reach conclusions which, though logical-
ly invalid, are consistent with popular 
opinion.74 The subjects of these tests 
were required to draw conclusions from 
two premises by the process of immedi-
ate inference, as 
If all men are mortal (major premise) , 
and 
If John is a 1nan (minor premise) ; then 
John is mortal (conclusion). 75 
The subjects of this study were given 
two sets of fifteen syllogisms in parallel 
form. In the first set of syllogisms letter 
symbols as X, Y, and Z were used as 
terms of the premises; in the second set, 
"vital issues which were being currently 
discussed in the papers and over the 
air were"76 incorporated as the terms. 
Given the invalid syllogism, for exam-
ple, 
Some ruthless men deserve a violent 
death; since one of the most ruthless of 
men was Heydrich, the Nazi hangman: 
1. Heydrich, the Nazi hangman, de-
served a violent death. 
2. Heydrich, the Nazi hangman, may 
have deserved a violent death. 
3. Heydrich, the Nazi hangman, did 
not deserve a violent death. 
4. Heydrich, the Nazi hangman, may 
not have deserved a violent death. 
5. None of the given conclusions 
seems to follow logically. 77 
in letter symbols, subjects tended to 
choose· the second conclusion presum-
ably under the influence of the particu-
73 Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Be-
havior, An Inventory of Findings (New York: Har-
court, Brace & World, 1964), p. 205. 
74 John J, B. Morgan and James T. Morton, "The 
Distortion of Syllogistic Reasoning Produced by Per-
sonal Convictions," Journal of Social Psychology, XX 
(August 1944), 39-59. 
75 Ibid., 40. 
76 Ibid., 45. 
77 Ibid., 48. 
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Jar-affirmative atmosphere of this syllo-
gism. Given the same syllogism as a pop-
ular issue, however, the same subjects 
tended to shift from the second to the 
first conclusion, an opinion which was 
"quite strong at the time that this test 
was given."78 In general terms the sub-
jects of the Morgan-Morton study be-
lieved that they were guided in their 
choice of conclusions by logical thought, 
though, in fact, when current issues were 
embodied in the syllogisms, they were 
being guided by popular opinion. Sim-
ilarly, it is not implausible that the oth-
er subjects who are our concern in this 
essay were influenced by a point of 
view traditional among librarians even 
though they faced a situation requiring 
rigid rules of thought which should have 
eliminated that point of view from con-
sideration. 
Whether it has been librarians or non-
librarians who have used the conven-
tional concept of reference to guide 
their empirical studies is largely unim-
portant. What is important is this. Under 
the conventional concept it has been as-
sumed in the empirical study of refer-
ence that only reference librarians per-
form reference, that the librarian's pro-
ficiency in the performance of reference 
is the result of his professional training 
and. experience, that the goal of the 
empirical study of reference is the mod-
ification of the librarian's education or 
of his practice, that observations of the 
librarian's performance are a sufficient 
basis on which to propose those modi-
fications which will improve the librar-
ian's proficiency. Since the empirical 
study of reference under these assump-
tions is capable only of augmenting the 
rules of thumb which underlie the li-
brarian's professional training and prac-
tice, it is clear under these assumptions 
78 Robert B. Downs, assisted by Elizabeth C. Downs, 
How to Do Library Research (Urbana: The University 
of Illinois Press, 1966). 
that no amount of study will permit an 
explanation of how the performance of 
reference takes place except in the trivi-
al sense that a manual of reliable refer-
ence guidelines, .e.g., Downs's How to Do 
Library R.esearch,78 explains the perform-
ance of reference. Though the conven-
tional concept of reference serves a use-
ful purpose, the basis for an esprit de 
corps, in the training and molding of 
reference librarians, it can hardly be 
surprising that this section of the essay 
concludes that empirical interpretation 
of the conventional concept is fruitless 
as a framework for the development of 
the empirical study of reference. 
SECITON IV 
In a previous section of the essay we 
observed that the notions basic to four 
empirical studies of reference were de-
ficient. They did not permit results 
which are reliable. In the last section, 
we observed that the empirical inter-
pretation of the conventional concept of 
reference is fruitless as a framework for 
the development of the empirical study 
of reference. For these reasons, this sec-
tion of the essay considers reference out-
side of librarianship. It suggests, intui-
tively, that reference is a special case of 
problem solving. 
First, several definitions of problem-
solving behavior are discussed, then sev-
eral approaches to the study of problem 
solving are described, first on the theo-
retical, then on the empirical level. The 
studies of problem solving which are 
described below were selected from 
those known to the author as the most 
suggestive for reference. In the next sec-
tion, these studies are briefly compared 
with the studies of reference previously 
reconstructed. 
To Duncker "a problem arises when 
a living creature has a goal but does 
not know how this goal is to be reached. 
Whenever one cannot go from the given 
situation to the desired situation simply 
by action, then there has to be recourse 
to thinking."79 Duncker, as have many 
psychologists, differentiated between 
routine and non-routine problem solving. 
In the terms of Dollard and Miller, that 
is between problems solved by automatic 
habits and trains of thought. 80 Surely, 
however, this distinction, used to differ-
entiate illegitimate from legitimate prob-
lems, is a fruitless one. What is reflexive 
to one may well be cognitive to another. 
To Reitman "a system has a problem 
when it has or has been given a de-
scription of something but does not yet 
have anything that satisfies the descrip-
tion."81 But in emphasizing what he calls 
"degrees of problematicality,"82 Reitman 
must tend to ignore a question implicit 
in Duncker' s definition, why may a 
given task be reflexive to one but cog-
nitive to another person. Indeed, Gagne 
suggests that "one of the fundamental 
criteria of problem solving is that a kind 
of performance which could not be ex-
hibited before the 'problem' was solved 
can be exhibited after the 'problem' is 
solved."83 To Gagne problem solving is 
"an inferred change in human capability 
that results in the acquisition of a gen-
eralizable rule which is novel to the in-
dividual, which cannot have been es-
tablished by direct recall, and which can 
manifest itself in applicability to the 
solution of a class of problems."84 
The simulation of cognition is one 
theoretical approach towards an under-
standing of problem-solving behavior. A 
computer is programmed to respond as 
a human would respond within a speci-
79 Karl Duncker "On Problem Solving," Psychologi-
cal Monographs, LVIII ( 1945), 1. 
80 John Dollard and Neal E. Miller, Personality and 
Psychotherapy, An Analysis in Terms of Learning, 
Thinking, and Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1950), p. 97-105. 
81 Reitman, op. cit., p. 126. 
s2 Ibid., p. 130. 
83 Gagne, op. cit., p. 130. 
84 Ibid., p. 132. 
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fied task domain. The computer pro-
gram, then, is a model or set of hypoth-
eses about the internal processes under-
lying human performance of a given 
task. "No physiological or neurological 
assumptions are made . . . these models 
conceive of the brain as an information 
processor."85 A program is run. The run 
generates predictions of the model. "In 
order to provide an adequate test, the 
behavior with which the computer out-
put is compared must, of course, be 
different from the behavior which served 
as a basis for the model's construction."86 
The results of the run are compared 
with relevant human results. That is the 
way predictions of the model are tested 
and, potentially, improved. 
Presumably a model of artificial intel-
ligence may also model human behav-
ior. The difference between models of 
cognitive simulation and artificial intel-
ligence is this: "An artificial intelligence 
researcher interested in programming a 
computer to play chess would be happy 
only if his program played good chess, 
preferably better chess than the best 
human player. However, the researcher 
interested in simulating the chess-play-
ing behavior of a given individual . . . 
wants his program to make the same 
moves as the human player, regardless 
of whether these moves are good, bad, 
or indifferent."87 Several of the following 
paragraphs describe Paige and Simon's 
test of Bobrow's artificial "Question-An-
swering System for· High School Algebra 
Word Problems"88 as a first approxima-
tion towards a model of "Cognitive Proc-
85 Edward A. Feigenbaum, "The Simulation of Ver-
bal Learning Behavior," Edward A. Feigenbaum and 
Julian Feldman ( eds.), Computers and Thought (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963 ), p. 297. 
86 K. R. Laughery and L. W. Gregg, "Simulation of 
Human Problem-Solving Behavior," Psychometrika, 
XXVII (September 1962 ), 279-80. 
87 Feigenbaum and Feldman, op. cit., p. 269. 
88 Daniel B. Bobrow, "A Question-Answering System 
for High School Algebra Word Problems," AFIPS Con-
ference Proceedings, XXVI, 1964 Fall Joint Computer 
Conference (Baltimore: Spartan Books, 1964). · 
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esses in Solving Algebra Word Prob-
lems."89 The question posed was what 
cognitive processes are necessary in solv-
ing algebra word problems; what proc-
esses are sufficient? 
The model is STUDENT. STUDENT com-
municates with human beings over a 
limited range of natural language. Its 
task environment is algebra word prob-
lems as 
(A NUMBER IS MULTIPLIED BY 6. THIS 
PRODUCT IS INCREASED BY 44. THIS RESULT 
IS 68. FIND THE NUMBER. ) 90 
STUDENT reads a problem statement, re-
writes it as a set of simpler sentences, 
transforms these sentences into equa-
tions, and attempts to solve the result-
ant set of equations. The student model 
understands a problem statement by 
"transforming it into an equivalent (in 
meaning) sequence of simpler kernel 
sentences. A kernel sentence is one 
which the listener can understand di-
rectly; that is, one for which he knows 
a transformation into his information 
store.''91 
Paige and Simon compared STUDENT's 
methods of transforming with human 
methods of translating algebra word 
problems into algebraic equations. The 
humans in this comparison were largely 
students. The students' processes were 
established on the basis of protocols; 
STUDENT's processes, on the basis of Bo-
brow's descriptions of his computer pro-
gram. 
STUDENT's transform of the problem 
statement given above reads: 
(THE EQUATIONS TO BE SOLVED ARE) 
(EQUAL X()()()() I (NUMBER) ) 
(EQUAL (PLUS (TIMES (NUMBER) 6) 44) 
68)92 
811 J effre~ M. Paige and Herbert A. Simon, "Cognitive 
Pr?cesses. m Solving Algebra Word Problems," Benja-
mm Klemmuntz ( ed.), Problem Solving: Research, 
Method, and Theory (New York: John Wiley & Sons 
1966). ' 
90 Bobrow, op. cit., p. 604. 
91 Ibid., p. 593. 
92 Ibid., p. 604. 
Some of the students translated the 
same problem statement in a similar 
manner, as 
The unknown is a 'certain number,' which 
would be x. Multiply x by 6. Write down 
'6x' please. 'Increased by' means add, so 
you put a plus 44. 'The result is' -indicate 
equals-write please-'68.'93 
Paige and Simon labeled this method 
direct translation, "a step-by-step sub-
stitution of algebraic symbols and ex-
pressions for the English words and 
phrases of the original problem state-
ments."94 
One of the sub-processes of translat-
ing English prose into algebraic equa-
tions, observed in both students and 
STUDENT, is the labeling of variables. The 
labels are of two sorts, conventional, i.e., 
x may be used as the abbreviatory name 
of some unknown, and relational, i.e., 
6x or 6x + 44 = 68 may be used as the 
relational names between the same un-
known and some known quantity. Un-
like the students, however, STUDENT "in-
troduces relational names only in the 
special case . . . where it is cued by the 
occurrence of the word 'this.' "95 
A sub-problem of naming, again ob-
served in both STUDENT and students is 
ambiguity of names. Two similar but 
distinct common language terms, for ex-
ample, may refer to the same object, 
though two distinct but similar common 
language terms may refer to different 
objects. To the problem 
(THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS THE RUSSIANS 
HAVE IS ONE HALF OF THE NUMBER OF 
GUNS THEY HAVE. THE NUMBER OF GUNS 
THEY HAVE IS 7000. WHAT IS THE NUM-
BER OF SOLDIERS THEY HAVE Q. ) 96 
a problem in which two different terms 
"Russian soldiers" and "they," refer t~ 
the same object, Russian soldiers, sTU-
DENT responds: 
93 Paige and Simon, op. cit., p. 70. 
9
• Ibid., p. 82-83. 
95 Ibid., p. 78. 
96 Bobrow, op. cit., p. 605. 
THE EQUATIONS WERE INSUFFICIENT TO 
FIND A SOLUTION 
(ASSUMING THAT) 
( (NUMBER OF SOLDIERS (THEY /PRO) 
(HAVE/VERB) ) IS EQUAL TO 
(NUMBER OF SOLDIERS RUSSIANS (HAVE/ 
VERB)) 
(THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS THEY HAVE 
IS 3500) 97 
To the problem 
The number of quarters a man has is seven 
times the number of dimes he has. The 
value of the dimes exceeds the value of 
the quarters by two dollars and fifty cents. 
How many has he of each coin?98 
a problem in which the expressions num-
ber and value are synonymous in cer-
tain contexts, a student responded in 
this fashion: 
Let's represent-- the fir-- --x as the dimes. 
Write down x please. The number of quar-
ters is-is seven times the dimes. There-
fore, the number of quarters is represented 
by 7x. Put '7x.' 'The value of the dimes 
exceeds the value of the quarters by two-
fifty'; therefore, x . . . Since it really is a 
money problem we will check this and dis-
cover that we really should multiply to 
make this-ah-to make it equal in value. 
Since we have 250 pennies we have to 
multiply the dimes by 10. So that should 
be lOx and a plus. Since it's quarters it 
would be 7 times 25 times x, on the other 
side. That is the correct solution.99 
In the former, the soldier problem, the 
cue through which STUDENT achieved a 
sufficient equation was a grammatical 
cue. The relationship, that is, between 
"Russian soldiers" and "they" is a gram-
matical one. In the latter, the coin prob-
lem, the cue was a substantive one. The 
student, that is, had to "know that the 
value of a quantity of coins equals the 
number of coins times the value per 
coin."100 Given the problem 
u1 Ibid. 
98 Paige and Simon, op. cit., p. 79. 
99 Ibid., p. 80-81. 
1oo Bobrow, op. cit., p. 604. 
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(IF 1 SPAN EQUALS 9 INCHES, AND 1 
FATHOM EQUALS 6 FEET, HOW MANY 
SPANS EQUAL 1 FATHOM Q. )100 
like a student, STUDENT "is able to draw 
on a body of facts, picking out relevant 
ones, and use them to obtain a solu-
tion"101 from its store of global informa-
tion. To that problem STUDENT responds: 
THE EQUATIONS WERE INSUFFICIENT TO 
FIND A SOLUTION 
(USING THE FOLLOWING KNOWN RELA-
TIONSHIPS) 
(EQUAL (TIMES 1 (FEET) ) TIMES 12 
(INCHES)) 
( 1 FATHOM IS 8 SPANS )102 
It became evident, however, that the 
students were using more powerful proc-
esses than those exhibited by STUDENT's 
use of definitional relationships. In trans-
lating the coin problem, one of the stu-
dents 
. . . found incongruity . . . if a man has 
seven times as many quarters as he has 
dimes and the value of the dimes exceeds 
the value of the quarters by two-fifty, the 
quarters must really not be worth too 
much, because if he has 7 times as many 
quarters as he has dimes, the number of-
the value of the quarters must exceed the 
dimes by 7 ° 2.5 - x, or what not .... 
negative quarters-no such thing exists.1o3 
Presumably, STUDENT would not have 
perceived this incongruity. Indeed, giv-
en the problem 
A car radiator contains exactly one liter of 
a 90 per cent alcohol-water mixture. What 
quantity of water will change the liter to 
an 80 per cent alcohol mixture?l04 
which is anomalous in the sense that it 
cannot be translated solely on the basis 
of the information given, it became ob-
vious that those students who achieved 
a successful translation of the problem 
statement did so by creating a physical 
representation of the problem which en-
101 Ibid., p. 605. 
102 Ibid., p. 604. 
103 Paige and Simon, op. cit., p. 86. 
1CM Ibid., p. 90. 
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abled them to read off certain conserva-
tion assumptions as though they were 
stated as part of the problem. As illus-
trated by De Soto, humans translate 
such problems as "Alice is taller than 
Mary; Elsie is shorter than Mary: Is 
Elsie taller than Alice? ... into an <up-
down' image and the answer is 'read 
off' the image."105 On this level, the 
iconic, STUDENT exhibits no processes 
similar to those of humans. Presumably, 
such processes "will have to be added 
to that program if it is to provide a 
satisfactory theory of the human behav-
ior observed in handling these prob-
lems."106 
The theoretical approach to problem 
solving behavior has experimental ana-
logs. In one a human is programmed to 
respond like a computer. "A list contain-
ing objects and relations between ob-
jects is stored in [human] memory, 
problems are presented to the human 
which require discovery of implications 
of the relations by successively operat-
ing on objects, the operations defined by 
the stored relations."107 
Hayes, for example, has been con-
cerned with problems solved by "a se-
quence of linked phases or steps which 
form a chain or path connecting the 
initial conditions of the problem with 
its goal."108 These problems are char-
acterized by homogeneity, information 
control, and modularity. That is, each 
step is of the same kind and of the same 
difficulty, the information necessary for 
solution is under the control of the prob-
105 C. De Soto, "Reasoning and Spatial Representa-
tions," Paper read at the Center for Cognitive Studies 
Colloquium, Harvard University, 1965, quoted in Je-
rome S. Brunner and Others, Studies in Cognitive 
Growth, A Collaboration at the Center for Cognitive 
Studies (New York : John Wiley & Sons, 1966) , p. 9. 
106 Paige and Simon, op. cit., p. 118. 
107 Garlie A. Forehand, "Epilogue: Constructs and 
Strategies for Problem-Solving Research," Benjamin 
Kleinmuntz ( ed.), Problem Solving: Research, Method, 
and Theory (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 
p. 369. 
108 John R. Hayes, "Problem Topology and the Solu-
tion Process," Journal ' of Verbal Learning and V erbal 
Behavior, IV (October 1965), 371. 
lem solver, and each problem can be 
constructed to any length with any num-
ber of blind alleys. Hayes has referred 
to these as spy problems. 
In a spy problem a subject was to 
imagine that he was running a spy ring. 
For security reasons some spies could 
communicate with each other, other 
spies could not. Prior to a run, subjects 
were required to commit to memory 
connection lists as 
SHOWER CLERK 
DROUGHT )HILL 
LARYNX BETH 
ADJECTIVE SHOWER 
HILL HORSE 
BEEF )LARYNX 
ADJECTIVE PARCHES! 
DROUGHT )KEVIN 
SHOWER BEEF 
LARYNX DROUGHT 
BEEF )TAFT109 
"to the criterion of three successive 
error-free trials."110 The subjects were 
then set problems to solve as "Get a 
message from HILL to ADJECTIVE." Dur-
ing the problem solutions subjects were 
requested to think aloud. 
Almost all of the subjects attempted 
to solve the problems by starting either 
at the initial state or the terminal state. 
Given the problem noted above, that 
would be either at HILL or at ADJECTIVE. 
Twenty-five per cent of all steps were 
executed in a backward direction. In 
general, however, subjects attempted 
backward solutions only when forward 
solutions failed. In some cases subjects 
employed list searching, a link-by-link 
search from the beginning to a desired 
point in the list under consideration. 
Like backward searching, list searching 
was also infrequent. It was frequently 
too John R. Hayes, "Memory, Goals, and Problem 
Solving," Benjamin Kleinmuntz, ed., Problem Solving: 
Research, Method, and Theory (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1966), p. 150. 
110 Hayes, "Problem Topology and the · Solution 
Process," loc. cit., 372. 
observed, however, that as subjects ap-
proached the solution to a problem, their 
rate of progress increased. A second ex-
periment, with a second set of subjects, 
was designed to probe this observation. 
The second experiment bore out the 
observation of the first, that as subjects 
approached solution their rate of prog-
ress accelerated. A second observation 
was made. When steps to go were taken 
into account, progress time did not vary 
with problem length. The rate of prog-
ress, that is, was being determined, not 
by the number of steps completed in a 
solution, but by the number of steps to 
be completed. Presumably subjects were 
covertly planning steps to be taken. 
Hayes inferred two sorts of strategies 
to account for these observations, local 
and remote planning. If, that is in the 
latter case, a subject was working 
through the ordered sequence A to F, 
for example, and noted "connections in 
the neighborhood of F, specifically ~E­
F,"' then, "when S gets from A to E, 
the step ~E to F' occurs rapidly because 
it has been planned."111 Indeed, it 
seems reasonable that a subject would 
not enter a blind alley at E, if he knew 
that the link E to F leads to the de-
sired solution. If, in the former case, a 
subject was exploring a few steps ahead 
"of his present position to a depth of 
one or perhaps more steps," then he is 
unlikely to fall into blind alleys espe-
cially when "with fewer steps to go, S 
is more likely to discover a solution path 
in his local covert exploration."112 
In another experimental analog to the 
theoretical approach to problem solving, 
human responses are compared with 
postulated computer responses. That is, 
given a problem to solve a human, in 
his response, would tend towards an 
ideal strategy of solution; a computer, on 
the other hand, presumably would be 
programmed to employ an ideal strate-
111 Ibid., 377. 
113 Ibid., 377-78. 
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gy. Thus, according to Bruner, Good-
now, and Austin, an ideal strategy is 
"an analytic device used as a yardstick 
against which to compare the perform-
ance of human operators in the situa-
tions we set them."113 
A Study of Thinking, by Bruner and 
his associates, concerned itself with prob-
lems of concept attainment, the task in 
which a ~numan being seeks to sort the 
environment into significant classes of 
events so that he may end by treating 
discriminably different things as equiva-
lents."114 Presumably, when a human 
organism has attained a concept he has 
done so by discovering cues by which 
he can infer the category membership 
of the objects and events he encounters. 
Presumably, that is, the organism has 
learned a set of relevant attributes and 
the conceptual rules by which the ap-
propriate values are combined to form 
the concept. For example, the concept 
spades, associated with playing cards, 
is cued by the relevant attributes, color 
and form, and is satisfied just by the 
joint presence of the values, black and 
spade-shaped. Presumably an organism 
attains a concept through his cognitive 
commerce with the environment by 
testing a series of exemplars and non-
exemplars of the concept. When the or-
ganism is free to choose instances to 
test, presumably he employs selection 
strategies. For example, "a neurologist is 
interested in six cortical areas and their 
bearing on pattern vision. He knows 
that with all six areas intact, pattern 
vision is unimpaired. With all six areas 
destroyed, pattern vision is absent. In 
planning his research, how shall he pro-
ceed? Destroy one area at a time? All 
but one at a time? In what order shall 
he do his successive experiments?"115 
One of the numerous empirical ques-
tions asked in this study of thinking was 
113 Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, op. cit., p. 241. 
m Ibid., p. viii 
u s Ibid., p. 81. 
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what effect does a disordered environ-
ment have upon human selection strate-
gies. 
Two groups of fifteen subjects each 
were set in the following task environ-
ments. An array of instances each ex-
hibiting one of two possible values of 
six attributes was presented . each sub-
ject. Each subject was shown a card ex-
emplifying a concept to be attained. The 
subject was to attain the concept by se-
lecting instances from the board for test-
ing. Each time he selected a card the 
subject was told that the choice either 
satisfied or did not satisfy the concept. 
Once per choice, whenever he wished, 
a subject could venture the identity of 
the concept. "The only difference be-
tween the two groups of fifteen subjects 
was in the arrangement of the cards on 
the board in front of them."116 For one 
group the environment was made order-
ly; for the other, it was made random or 
disordered. 
Presumably both sets of subjects 
would attempt to insure each instance 
selected for testing, informative. The 
subjects working in the ordered environ-
ment, however, clearly had an advan-
tage over their colleagues working in 
the disordered environment. "The Ran-
dom Group," that is, "was faced with an 
array of instances whose arrangement 
gave little or no visual support to the 
subjects in the task of sorting out posi-
tive from negative instances in order to 
attain the correct concept."117 Presum-
ably, then, both sets of subjects would 
attempt to insure each instance selected 
informative within the constraints im-
posed by the environment in which they 
worked. 
Under ideal conditions a concept could 
be attained in six choices. It was pre-
dicted that the Ordered Group would 
tend toward a conservative-focussing 
strategy, i.e., "finding a positive instance 
116 Ibid. , p. 97. 
u 1 Ibid., p. 98. 
to use as a focus, then making a se-
quence of choices each of which alters 
but one attribute value of the first focus 
card and testing to see whether the 
change yields a positive or a negative 
instance."118 It was predicted that the 
Random Group would tend toward a 
successive scanning strategy, i.e., testing 
a single hypothesis at a time until the 
correct one is found. 
The results of the experiment general-
ly confi1med the predictions. The Or-
dered Group required an average of 6.1 
choices per problem to attain the cor-
rect concepts; the Random Group re-
quired 10.4 choices. The former group 
employed 1.1 attribute values which dis-
tinguished a first choice and the first 
positive card given, made an average of 
1 redundant choice per problem and 
offered an average of 0.5 incorrect hy-
potheses per problem; the latter group, 
respectively, 1.8 attribute values, 4.1 re-
dundant choices and 1.4 incorrect 
hypotheses. Presumably the Ordered 
Group was successful in selecting in-
formative instances, largely focusing on 
the first card given, whereas the Ran-
dom Group was unsuccessful, selecting 
redundant and inconsistent instances. 
SECTION v 
This, the final section of the essay, 
compares briefly and generally the 
studies of reference reconstructed in 
Section I with the studies of problem 
solving described in Section IV. It pur-
poses to indicate several ways in which 
the study of reference may be clarified 
when interpreted as a special case of 
the study of problem solving. 
The studies of problem solving either 
inferred human competence, i.e., what 
can reasonably be hypothesized about 
the internal processes underlying the 
performance of a task, from perform-
ance, i.e., what a person does in the 
performance of a task, or inferred per-
u s Ibid. , p. 87. 
formance from competence. In Bruner's 
words: 
To infer a person's representation of the 
world, if we are uncanny experimenters, 
we design tasks that permit us to infer 
how he does these things. We ask him to 
tell us the fifty states of the Union. If he 
'reads out' in this order, 'Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont . . . ,' we can guess 
that the supporting representation for his 
recital is spatial. If the order is 'Alabama, 
Arkansas, California . . . ,' the support is 
inferred to be more list-like, ordered by an 
alphabetic rule.l19 
The studies of reference, on the other 
hand, inferred performance from partic-
ular performance. Generated by the in-
ference of performance from particular 
performance, the results of the studies 
of reference, unlike the results of the 
studies of problem solving, are devoid 
of any generality whatever. Devoid of 
generality, these results cannot reason-
ably be used to satisfy the objectives of 
the study of reference, the modification 
either of the preparation for the prac-
tice of reference or of the practice of 
reference itself. 
What the empirical studies of refer-
ence have to tell us about reference was 
told by a direct confrontation with re-
ality, a reality, we observed in Section 
IV, which has been perceived imper-
fectly. The studies of problem solving 
have eschewed a confrontation with re-
ality. They have thereby been freed to 
invent a modeled reality. 
Though other models have been de-
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vised,120 the basic models used in the 
studies of problem solving were infor-
mation-processing models. These models 
were variously formulated as a comput-
er program, as a human programmed 
like a computer, or as a human with 
processes analogous to the routines of a 
computer program. In all cases, these 
models were set to operate over models · 
of well-defined task domains. By virtue 
of the information processing models, it 
was possible for the studies of problem 
solving to specify and verify complex 
human processes as focusing and scan-
ning strategies, local and remote plan-
ning, and routines for translating alge-
bra word problems into algebraic equa-
tions. Indeed, given the information-
processing models of human comp~­
tence, it becomes clear that what differ-
entiates the reference librarian from 
other human beings is not simply his 
preparation for and practice of refer-
ence, but the way in which he has 
learned to encode the task domain over 
which he works. 
The concepts which structured the 
studies of problem solving differed dras-
tically in precision and predictive con-
tent from the deficient notions which 
structured the studies of reference. This 
was especially noticeable of the con-
structs governing the task domains. 
Paige and Simon, for example, were 
able to identify nine distinct substantive 
quantities entailed by the physical cir-
cumstances described in the mixture 
problem: 
INITIAL SITUATION CHANGES FINAL SITUATION 
T 1-total quantity of original 
mixture 
AT -quantity of liquid added T z--total quantity of final 
mixture 
A1-quantity of alcohol in 
original mixture 
AA-quantity of alcohol added Az--quantity of alcohol in 
final mixture 
W1-quantity of water in 
original mixture 
A W -quantity of water added W z--quantity of water in 
final mixture121 
u 9 Bruner and Others, Studies in Cognitive Growth, 
p. 7. 
130 For examples see David Harrah, Communication: 
A Logical Model (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. 
Press, 1963); and Mihajlo D. Mesarovic, "Toward a 
Formal Theory of Problem Solving," Margo A. Sass 
and William D. Wilkinson, eds., Symposium on Com-
puter Augmentation of Human Reasoning (Washing-
ton: Spartan Books, 1965). 
121 Paige and Simon, op. cit., p. 100. 
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As a result, they were able to infer just 
those conservation assumptions which 
must have been used by the subjects 
who solved this problem. 
The ubiquitous construct of the infor-
mation processing models was the strat-
egy. Though referred to by different 
terms, simply as routines and sub-rou-
tines in the Paige and Simon paper and 
as planning in Hayes's papers, a strategy 
is generally a sequence of decisions, 
some conscious and others not, which 
governs the order and placement of trans-
formations and storage holds through 
which a set of problem data is manipu-
lated in an attempted problem solution. 
The basic method of probing strate-
gies in these studies was protocol analy-
sis, a method of tracing human data 
processing by means of a stream of con-
scious verbal behavior. Though superior 
to the questionnaire, protocol analysis 
has several disadvantages which we 
shall note. Nevertheless, in the hands of 
Paige and Simon it was cleverly used to 
its fullest advantage. By setting their 
subjects incongruous problems to solve, 
Paige and Simon were able to elicit the 
employment of conservation assump-
tions and the visual representations from 
which they emerged. Presumably these 
are human processes which are not con-
sciously used by sophisticated subjects 
in handling routine problems. 
Studies of problem solving are not, of 
course, without internal difficulties. Pro-
tocol analysis is often cited as being in-
tersubjectively variable. When sophisti-
cated subjects are used, the extent of 
previous processing of problem data 
prior to the emission of protocol state-
. ments is in determinant. As a construct, 
the strategy has not been made entirely 
clear. What occurs, for example, when a 
step in a strategy is executed? What unit 
of information undergoes transformation 
in a single step, a word, a phrase, or is 
it even a linguistic unit? Current studies 
seem to imply different strategies for 
different tasks, an inelegant implication 
at best. Indeed, the information-process-
ing models have several obvious draw-
backs. They have proven useful only 
over well specified task domains as alge-
bra word problems and stripped down 
concept attainment tasks. Statements of 
artificial intelligence and simulation of 
cognition are limited by the exigencies 
of computer programming and model, 
generally, a particular individual, pos-
sibly the programmer himself. 
It has been observed that to state an 
empirical problem "which will not be 
either completely trivial or hopelessly 
beyond the range of present-day under-
standing and technique,"122 is extremely 
difficult. The studies of reference are 
surely a case in point. A ubiquitous con-
cern of these studies, what is a reference 
question, has clearly preceded the de-
limitation of a necessarily prior concern, 
what is a question. 
Indeed, what is a question? As Hamb-
lin has put it by these examples, 
(a) Rhetorical question: 'I ask you, gen-
tlemen of the jury, can such a man 
be innocent?' is really not a question 
but a statement. 
(b) An indicative sentence with a char-
acteristic tone of voice: 'This is the 
Canberra train I'm on?'-not really a 
statement but a question. 
(c) 'Tell me how many fingers I'm hold-
ing up.' a command, but at least al-
most equally a question.123 
a question is not a simple grammatical 
distinction. Sprotsy has identified ques-
tions as psychological phenomena, as 
phases in problem solving: 
A question follows the detection of a gap 
in what can be termed ... one's cognitive 
map of an area. But it seems likely that as 
soon as this gap is identified the thinker 
bridges it with some concept or idea based 
on the knowledge he has at hand. Further-
122 Noam Chomsky, "Review of Verbal Behavior," 
by B. F. Skinner, Language, XXXV (January-March 
1959), 55. 
123 C. L. Hamblin, "Questions,'' Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy, XXXVI (July-September 1957) , 388. 
more, the extent to which he can commu-
nicate the nature of this 'bridge' varies. . . . 
Questions, then, are not simply requests for 
information. The information that a sub-
ject seemingly requests and receives, ac-
tually confirms or refutes . . . the cogni-
tive bridge he has already erected to close 
a cognitive gap.124 
In transformational generative gram-
mar, it has been posited that questions 
are both a linguistic and psychological 
concern. Transformation grammar has 
hypothesized three sets of rules, phrase 
structure, transformation, and morpho-
phonemic, through which sentences of 
the language are generated. Under this 
view of grammatical structure, the sen-
tence "What are you looking for? can 
be described as a what-question trans-
form of You are looking for it, and What 
are you running for? as a why-question 
transform from You are running.''125 
There is some evidence for the psy-
chological reality of such transforma-
tions. Savin and Perchonock, for exam-
ple, assuming that "immediate memory 
has a small fixed capacity and that sen-
tences are encoded in the way that a 
transformational grammar suggests,"126 
124 Paul Sprotsy, "The Use of Questions in the Prob-
lem Solving Process" (unpublished PhD dissertation, 
Department of Psychology, Western Reserve Univer-
sity, 1962), p. 18-19. 
l25 Robert B. Lees, "Review of Syntactic Structures" 
by Noam Chomsky, Language, XXXIII ( July-Septem-
ber 1957), 388. 
126 Harris B. Savin and Ellen Perchonock, "Gram-
matical Structure and the Immediate Recall of English 
Sentences," ] ournal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, IV (October 1965), 349. 
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had human subjects encode such trans-
formations as negatives, passives, ques-
tions, into immediate memory. If, Savin 
and Perchonock hypothesized, transfor-
mations required more space in immedi-
ate memory than kernels, short active 
indicative assertions, then spatial differ-
entials were calculable on the basis of 
the number of words a subject could re-
call after the encoding of sentence plus 
word string. The results of this and simi-
lar studies have nicely supported the 
theoretical predictions that transforma-
tions, as negatives and questions, are 
encoded in human memory independent 
of other characteristics of a sentence. 
Though the evidence is still question-
able, i.e., the results of the Savin-Perch-
onock study, may, as the authors sug-
gest, be explicable on such grounds as 
sentence length or retrieval interference, 
it is clear that the transform hypothesis 
will have to be taken into account in 
any serious formulation of our concept 
of questions. 
In part the basic question posed here, 
what is the disposition of the empirical 
study of reference, has been answered. 
But only a very small part of that ques-
tion was asked in this essay. From many 
points of view the specific questions 
asked were probably not pertinent to 
the basic question. Nevertheless, a posit 
of criticism is that criticism begets crit-
icism. Hopefully, then, other points of 
view will be heard from. Hopefully, 
some will be given expression as empiri-
cal studies, others as critical studies .•• 
